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HOSPITAL MED.ICAL STAFF: WHEN ARE 
PRIVILEGE DENIALS JUDICIALLY REVIEWABLE? 
The relationship between a hospital and its medical staff is unique. 
Most physicians serving as hospital staff are not salaried employees .1 
Rather, they use hospital facilities to care for their patients pursuant to 
"staff privileges" granted by the hospital's board of governors. 2 Staff 
privileges at one area hospital are practically indispensable for the mod-
ern physician,3 and privileges at a conveniently located hospital are 
considered important. 4 By extending staff privileges the hospital benefits 
from having a staff large enough to ensure maximum use of its facilities. 5 
The public benefits when an adequate number of qualified physicians 
have access to hospit~ facilities. 6 
Despite the importance to physicians, hospitals, and the public of 
reasonable grants of medical staff privileges, procedures for staff selec-
tion are often capricious and arbitrary. 7 Although staff privileges are 
officially granted by the hospital's board, the actual decisions concerning 
staff selection are generally made by members of the hospital's current 
medical staff.8 These medical staffs often function like "exclusive social 
clubs or secret fraternal societies, " 9 having power to exclude an applicant 
for "ideological, moral or even political reasons," 10 or for no reason at 
all. 11 Furthermore, the denial of privileges at one hospital may have 
adverse 12 or even disastrous 13 consequences for the physician's career in 
general. Widespread abuse in the staff selection process has been alleged 
or documented in numerous cases and may involve conspiracy to exclude 
I See M. ROEMER & J. FRIEDMAN, DOCTORS IN HOSPITALS 4, 25 (1971). 
2 HEALTH LAW CENTER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 25 (2d ed. 1974). 
3 Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1968); Wyatt v. Tahoe 
Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 7f.1J, 715, 345 P.2d 93, 97 (1959); Southwick, Hospital 
Medical Staff Pri1,i/eges, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 655, 658 (1969). 
4 ' Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 511, 119 Cal. Rptr. 
507, 5(1) (1975). 
5 Personal communications with G. Flick, Hospital Administrator, University of Michi-
gan Hospital, and L. Bums, Hospital Administrator, University of Wisconsin Hospital. See 
ROEMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 110-11. 
6 Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540 P.2d 345, 348-49 (Colo. App. 1975); Greisman v. Newcomb 
Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 402, 192 A.2d 817, 824 (1963); Fritz v. Huntington Hosp., 39 N.Y.2d 
339, 348, 348 N.E.2d 547, 554, 384 N.Y.S.2d 92,99 (1976). 
1 Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
8 Joining The Hospital's Professional Social Club, ACTION KIT FOR HOSPITAL LAW, 
November, 1973, at 3. 
9 Id. 
io Id. 
II See Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540 P.2d 345, 348 (Colo. App. 1975). 
12 Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 1974). 
13 Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 
(1974). 
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new competltton for patients, 14 race discrimination, 15 bias against os-
teopathic doctors, 16 intolerance of a doctor's criticism of hospital pol-
icy, 17 irrationally restrictive bylaws, 18 mistaken summary appraisal of a 
doctor based on uncorroborated hearsay and rumor, 19 and conspiracy to 
exclude a physician who testifies extensively in malpractice litigation.20 
In light of these abuses and the importance of properly granting staff 
privileges, there should be some means of correcting improper denials of 
staff privileges. If the hospital is a public institution, owned and operated 
by the government, a physician denied staff privileges may contest the 
denial in court and assert his right to the due process and equal protection 
safeguards of the United States Constitution and to certain federal stat-
utory safeguards. 21 Most hospitals, however, are private, non-profit or-
ganizations,22 and some small, private hospitals are even operated for 
profit. 23 The question whether the denial of staff privileges by a private 
hospital is judicially reviewable has been approached differently by the 
courts. All of the approaches provide the same kind of protection for the 
physician: procedural and substantive safeguards to ensure a fair hearing 
on his qualifications.24 However, the approaches differ in the factors that 
14 Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 
640 (1962); Burkhart v. Community Medical Center, 432 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1968); Cowan v. 
Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965); Raymond v. Cregar, 38 N.J. 472, 185 A.2d 856 (1962); 
Hagan v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp. of R.I., 102 R.l. 717, 232 A.2d 596 (1967); Nashville 
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Binkley, 534 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1976). 
15 Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968); Meredith v. Allen 
County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport 
News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 
F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). 
16 Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); Schneir v. Englewood 
Hosp. Ass'n, 91 N.J. Super. 527, 221 A.2d 559 (1966). Cf. Falcone v. Middlesex County 
Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961) (regarding application of osteopathic 
physician for membership to a local medical society). Legislation has ameliorated the 
problem for osteopaths to some extent. HEAL TH LAW CENTER, supra note 2, at 199. 
Compare Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927) with Stribling v. Jolley, 253 
S.W.2d 519 (Mo. App.' 1953). 
17 Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 
(1974); Hagan v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp. of R.l., 102 R.l. 717, 232 A.2d 596 (1967). 
18 Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Foster v. Mobile 
County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968); Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial 
Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1975); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 
389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963). 
19 Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 
(1974). 
20 Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 ()st Cir. 1972). 
21 Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1975); Schooler v. Navarro 
County Memorial Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Shulman v. Washington Hosp. 
Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963). See generally Anno!., 37 A.L.R.3d 645, 666-69 
(1971). See note 30 infra, for a discussion of the safeguards imposed. 
22 ROEMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 3, 18. See BUREAU OF HEALTH MANPOWER, 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEP'T OF HEW AND THE AMERICAN HOSP. Ass'N, MANPOWER 
RESOURCES IN HosPITALs-1966, at I (1966). Private non-profit hospitals··are often called 
"voluntary" hospitals. 
23 ROEMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 18. 
24 Compare Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1975) (constitutional 
due process protection) with Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 53 Cal. App. 3d 196, 
127 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1976) (common law fiduciary duty protection). 
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must be present before the court has jurisdiction to apply those 
safeguards. This article discusses the various approaches and favors the 
one that imposes a common law fiduciary duty upon all voluntary hospi-
tals to ensure that staff privileges are not unreasonably denied. 
I. AVAILABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
ST A TU TORY PROTECTION 
State statutes dealing with the denial of hospital staff privileges often 
apply only to public hospitals, and only to the most prevalent forms of 
discrimination. 25 A notable exception, however, is a recently amended 
New York statute which provides that the denial of staff privileges must 
be related to "standards of patient care, patient welfare, the objectives of 
the institution or the character or competency of the applicant. " 26 In Fritz 
v. Huntington Hospital, 27 the New York Court of Appeals held that the 
statute applied to both private and public hospitals. 28 Furthermore, the 
court ruled that physicians who had been denied privileges had standing 
to seek injunctive relief under the statute. 29 
Judicial review does not deprive the hospital of its broad discretion in setting professional 
and ethical qualifications; but generally the substantive criteria which a board may rely upon 
in refusing to grant privileges must be reasonably related to the operation of the hospital. 
The following cases illustrate reasonable grounds for denying privileges. Guerrero v. Bur-
lington County Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 360 A.2d 334 (1976), and Davis v. Morristown 
Memorial Hosp., !06 N.J. Super. 33, 254 A.2d 125 (1969) (overcrowding); Bricker v. Sceva 
Speare Memorial Hosp., Ill N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971), 
Huffaker v. Bailey, 540 P.2d 1398, 1400-01 (Ore. 1975) and Hagan v. Osteopathic Gen. 
Hosp., 102 R.I. 717, 726, 232 A.2d 596, 601-02 (1967) (disruptive influence, uncooperative-
ness, or personality clash adversely affecting hospital efficiency); Schneir v. Englewood 
Hosp. Ass'n, 91 N.J. Super. 527, 221 A.2d 559 (1966) (inexperience, mediocre academic 
record, and no pressing need for privileges); Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ohio 
App. 2d 246, 250 N.E.2d 892 (1969) (podiatrist reasonably excluded). A physician's staff 
privileges may be summarily suspended where continued care by the physician might 
endanger his patients, but a hearing must be held within a reasonable time. Citta v. Delaware 
Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 3 IO (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
The applicant is also generally entitled to procedural fairness, including notice of any 
adverse charges and an opportunity to be heard. Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde 
Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1971). The aid of counsel for the applicant 
may be appropriate where the charges are especially serious, or where the hospital's 
attorney is present. Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 485, 497 P.2d 564, 572, 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972). See generally Note, Denial of Hospital Staff Privileges: 
Hearing and Judicial Review, 56 low AL. REV. 1351 (1971); Comment, Hospital Medical 
Staff Privileges: Recent Developments In Procedural Due Process Requirements, 12 WIL-
LAMETIE L.J. 137 (1975). 
25 Porter Memorial Hosp. v. Harvey, 279 N.E.2d 583 (Ind. App. 1972); Moore v. Board of 
Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 
(1972). See generally HEALTH LAW CENTER, supra note 2, at 188-95. 
State restraint of trade statutes have generally been held inapplicable to a hospital's 
refusal to grant staff privileges. Moles v. White, 336 So. 2d 427 (Fla. App. 1976). See 
generally Southwick, Hospital Medical Staff Privileges, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 655, 669 
(1969). 
26 N.Y. Pue. HEALTH LAW§ 2801-b(I) (McKinney Supp. 1975). 
27 39 N.Y.2d 339, 348 N.E.2d 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1976). 
28 /d. at 345, 348 N.E.2d at 552, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 96. 
29 /d. at 345-46, 348 N.E.2d at 552-53, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 96-97. The court remanded the 
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Despite the limited protection under most state statutes, federal con-
stitutional and. statutory protection is available when "state action" is 
found. 30 State action is clearly present if the hospital is public.31 How-
ever, determining whether there is state action in the private hospital 
setting is more complex. Most voluntary hospitals have varying degrees 
of involvement with federal, state, and local government. Proprietary 
hospitals are also extensively regulated and may indirectly receive sub-
stantial funding through medicare and medicaid programs. 32 The courts 
have applied three principle tests for state action in the private hospital 
setting. 
A. The Nexus Test 
Under the nexus test for state action, there must be a direct connection 
between the state and the hospital's denial of staff privileges. A three-
pronged formulation of the test is set forth in Barrett v. United Hospital. 33 
First, state involvement with the hospital must be significant. Second, the 
state must be involved in the act which caused the injury, that is, the 
denial of privileges. Third, the state's involvement must aid, encourage, 
or connote approval of the injurious act. 
In applying the nexus test, the Barrett court ruled that tax-emption, the 
receipt of substantial federal aid, and extensive state regulation of hospi-
tals did not satisfy the nexus requirement. There was no direct connection 
between those state activities and the hospital's policies regarding the 
case for a hearing on the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the defendant hospital's exclusion 
of all osteopathic doctors failed to meet the requirements of the statute. 
30 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution provide that the state shall 
not deprive a person of "liberty, or property, without due process of law" nor deny to any 
person "equal protection of the laws." Hospital staff privileges are generally considered to 
be a property or liberty interest of the physician. Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 
F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1968); Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 715, 
345 P.2d 93, 97 (1959); North Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Kauffman, 544 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Mont. 
1976); Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 453 Pa. 60, 71-72, 80-81, 311 A.2d 634, 640, 644-45, 
(1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974). But see Shaw v. Hosp. Authority, 507 F.2d 625, 
628 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975); Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 499 F.2d 1364, 1366 (7th Cir. 1974). 
Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), which held that a non-tenured teacher 
without other contractual agreement had no constitutionally protected property or liberty 
interest in continued employment at a public school. Nonetheless, Roth was found not to 
apply to a physician's interest in having hospital staff privileges in Schlein v. Milford Hosp., 
383 F. Supp. 1263, 1264 (D. Conn. 1974). 
Because staff privileges are generally viewed as a property or liberty interest, the principle 
issue where privileges are denied is whether state action is involved. This is also generally 
true for related federal statutory protection. 42 U .S.C. § 1983 (1970) ("under color of state 
law"). Dicta in some cases have suggested that 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) may apply to invidious 
class discrimination despite the absence of state action. Pollock v. Methodist Hosp., 392 F. 
Supp. 393, 395 (E.D. La. 1975); Barrio v. McDonough Dist. Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 317, 319-20 
(S.D. Ill. 1974). Nonetheless, it is unlikely that invidious class discrimination will be present 
in many privilege denials. In Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1233 (!st Cir. 1972), for 
example, the court held that physicians who had testified extensively in malpractice litiga-
tion did not comprise a suspect class. See generally Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 
(1971). 
31 See note 22 supra. 
32 Monyek v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc., 273 So. 2d 430 (Fla. App. 1973). 
33 376 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af.fd, 506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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termination of staff privileges.34 There were, for example, no state re-
quirements that the hospital's bylaws governing the staff appointment 
process receive state approval, nor were any state nominees sitting on the 
board of trustees. 35 
The only decision where state action has been found in a private 
hospital under the nexus test is Aas um v. Good Samaritan Hospital. 36 In 
Aasum, the plaintiff chiropractor claimed that the hospital's refusal to 
permit him access to clinical laboratory facilities to treat his patients was 
unreasonable and discriminatory. The defendant private, non-profit hos-
pital's refusal was based on recommendations of the Oregon Board of 
Medical Examiners concerning use of hospital facilities by persons not 
licensed to practice medicine. In view of this' connection between the 
state agency and the hospital's exclusion of the plaintiff, the court found 
state action under the Barrett formulation of the nexus test. The court, 
however, sustained the constitutionality of the hospital's action .. 
In both Barrett 37 and Aas um, 38 the courts noted that a less restrictive 
test would be applied where there are allegations of racial discrimination. 
Other courts are in accord with this double state action standard, 39 but the 
standard has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court. 40 In other re-
spects, however, the nexus test is more consistent with recent Supreme 
Court rulings than the other two tests for state action commonly em-
ployed by the courts: In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 41 a public 
utility that held a partial monopoly because of extensive state regulation 
terminated a consumer's electric service without advance notice or a 
prior hearing. The Court held that no state action was present because the 
termination policy had been initiated by the utility and had never been 
specifically approved by the state regulatory agency. 42 The Court found 
that there was no direct connection between the state and the termination 
of electric service. The Court also held that the company was not fulfilling 
a "public function" to an extent that would constitute state action. 43 
34 Id. at 800-05. 
35 Id. at 803. 
36 395 F. Supp. 363 (D. Ore. 1975), afj'd, 542 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1976). 
37 376 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
38 395 F. Supp. 363, 367 n.4, 368 (D. Ore. 1975). 
39 Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pacific Medical Center, 507 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (Duniway, 'J., concurring); Ponca City Hosp. v. Murphree, 545 P.2d 738, 742. 
(Okla. 1976). 
40 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). 
41 419 u .s. 345 (1974). 
42 Id. at 355-57. 
43 Id. at 352-54. These rulings in Jackson appear to retreat from the state action decisions 
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). In Burton, the Court found state action where a restaurant leased. 
space in a parking structure owned and operated by a state agency and built with public 
funds. The Court premised its finding of state action on whether "to some significant extent 
the State in any of its manifestations has ... become involved," and noted that "[o]qly by 
sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in 
private conduct be attributed its true significance." 365 U.S. at 722. The Court reasoned that 
state ·action was present because the restaurant was operated as an integral part of the public 
parking structure and benefitted from the building's tax-exempt status, and because the state 
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Although the nexus test is generally in accord with the Supreme Court's 
state action decision in Jackson, the test does not provide adequate 
protection for physicians denied staff privileges by private hospitals. 44 
Consequently, adequate protection under a theory of state action can be 
afforded physicians only if the Court's decision is held inapplicable in the 
hospital setting. 
B. The Significant State Involvement Test 
A few courts, relying on early Supreme Court rulings, apply a relatively 
broad test for state action in the hospital setting.45 State action is present 
wherever state involvement with the hospital is significant, as viewed 
after sifting and weighing all relevant facts and circumstances.46 Neither a 
direct nexus between the state and the denial of staff privileges nor state 
approval of the denial is required. 
In cases decided under this test, findings of state action have rested 
primarily on the presence of substantial federal funding. 47 Hospital fund-
ing for capital expenditures is derived chiefly from the Hill-Burton Act. 48 
A finding of state action is likely where Hill-Burton funds account for 
one-third to one-half of the costs for any large hospital construction 
agency by its inaction had tacitly supported the restaurant's discrimination against the 
plaintiff. 365 U.S. at 724-25. 
In Moose lodge, however, the Court found no state action in a state agency's issuance of 
a liquor license, where it was issued to a private club, located in a private building, which did 
not hold itself out as a public accommodation. The Court again noted the importance of 
"sifting facts and weighing circumstances," 407 U.S. at 172 (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 
722), and stated that the test was whether the state had "significantly involved itself' with 
the discrimination. 407 U.S. at 173 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)). 
The Court found none of the factors that constituted significant state involvement in Burton. 
44 Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 36, at 7, is the only case in which state 
action has been found under this test. 
45 This approach was first formulated and has been consistently applied by the Fourth 
Circuit. See Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974). 
Arguably, the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits are in accord. Klinge v. Lutheran Charities 
Ass'n of St. Louis, 523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1975); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 
339 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D.N.H. 1972), affd sub nom. on other grounds, Bricker v. Crane, 468 
F.2d 1228 (!st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973). Compare Citta v. Delaware 
Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970) with Ozlu v. Lock Haven Hosp., 369 F. 
Supp. 285 (M.D. P-a. 1974). The Eastern District of Louisiana is in accord. Pollock v. 
Methodist Hosp., 392 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. La. 1975). In addition, support for a broader test 
has been expressed by members of two state courts. Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 453 
Pa. 60, 311 A.2d 634 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974); Silver v. Castle Memorial 
Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 487, 497 P.2d 564, 572-73 (1972) (Abe, J., concurring), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1048 (1972). The Tenth Circuit appears to have rejected this approach. Compare 
Don v. Okmulgee Memorial Hosp., 443 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1971) with Ward v. St. Anthony 
Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973). 
46 Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 966-67 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). The 
test is derived primarily from Burton v. Wilmington P-arking Auth., 365 U.S. 163 ( 1972). See 
note 43 supra. 
47 Because federal funding has been so pervasive in hospital construction, the test is 
sometimes expressed as if that were the only criterion. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. 
Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826, 828 (4th Cir. 1969); Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 800 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
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project. 49 
The Hill-Burton Act, however, is more than merely a source of hospital 
funding. The Act also establishes state-wide planning for the construction 
of all public and private non-profit hospitals. 50 This regulatory aspect 
increases the "significance" of any funds received by a hospital and may 
be significant even where no funds are received. In Eaton v. Grubbs, 51 for 
example, although the defendant non-profit hospital had not received any 
Hill-Burton funds, the pervasiveness of the state's participation in the 
Hill-Burton program contributed to the finding of significant state in-
volvement. The court also considered the hospital's history of local grants 
and tax-exemptions, the county's reversionary interest in the hospital's 
real property, and the benefits to the hospital from the state's exercise of 
its power of eminent domain. 52 
Unlike the nexus test for state action,53 the significant state involve-
ment test is not relaxed in cases of alleged racial discrimination. 54 The 
pivotal case was Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Association, 55 
where the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant hospitals' refusal to grant 
staff privileges to physicians not having offices and practices within the 
county was irrational and discriminatory, and thus a denial of equal 
protection. The court held that the same state action test should be 
applied as in prior cases involving racial discrimination. 56 The court then 
found that state action was present under the significant state involve-
ment test because both hospitals had received substantial Hill-Burton 
funds. 57 
The same test was applied in subsequent cases where the physician 
claimed that he had been denied due process, rather than equal protec-
tion. In Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association, 58 for 
example, the court affirmed the district court's finding of state action by a 
private, non-profit hospital based on county and Hill-Burton funding for 
capital expenditures. Having found state action, the court held that the 
plaintiff's hospital privileges could not be terminated without due pro-
cess.59 
49 Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826, 827 (4th Cir. 1969); Citta v. 
Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1970). . 
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 291c-291e (Supp. V 1975). See generally Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 
F.2d 671 n.5 (10th Cir. 1973); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 
963-65 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). 
5 ' 329 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1964). 
52 Id. at 712-13. 
53 See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra. 
54 See Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 257 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. W. Va. 1966). 
rev'd on other grounds, 413 F.2d 826, 828 (4th Cir. 1969); Pollock v. Methodist Hosp., 392 F. 
Supp. 393, 395 (E.D. La. 1975). 
55 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969). 
56 Id. at 828. 
57 One hospital had received $3,352,755 to assist construction of a new addition costing a 
total of$9,863,758. The other hospital had received $625,976 for a new wing costing a total of 
$1,264,696. In addition, both hospitals had received appreciable private contributions from 
the community. Id. at 827. 
58 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974). 
59 Id. at 178. 
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Although the significant state involvement test goes far toward expand-
ing protection for the physician concerning staff privileges, certain prob-
lems inhere in the approach. The test is apparently not in accord with the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Jackson that requires application of the 
nexus test criteria, at least in cases outside the hospital context. 60 The 
significant state involvement test is also mo·re vague than the nexus test 
because it focuses generally on the "significance" of state involvement 
with the institution rather than on a direct connection between the state 
and the injurious act. 61 Because it is vague, the test does not provide 
adequate guidance for hospitals. Finally, increased findings of state action 
for the purpose of safeguarding medical staff privileges concomitantly 
subject the hospital to suits based on other constitqtional claims, includ-
ing claims by patients which may be appropriate only against truly public 
hospitals. 62 
C. Public Function Test For State Action 
The Sixth Circuit has applied a public function test,63 which forms an 
intermediate approach to the state action question in the private hospital 
setting. Under this test, a hospital is subject to constitutional and stat-
utory constraints on state action if it is fulfilling the role of a public 
agency. Although a direct nexus between the state and the denial of staff 
privileges is not required, something more than regulation and partial 
state funding must be shown. 64 For example, the appointment of a private 
60 See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra. 
61 See Part I.A. supra. See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 636-41 (2d 
Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Ascherman v. 
Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical Center, 507 F.2d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duni-
way, J., concurring). 
62 For example, in Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 
1975), the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the 
defendant hospital's policy of prohibiting abortions except for the purpose of saving the life 
of the mother. The court rul.ed that, absent en bane reconsideration, it was constrained to 
apply the same state action test as in prior cases involving the staff privilege issue. Because 
the hospital had received substantial Hill-Burton funds, state action was found and the 
hospital's anti-abortion policy was held in violation of the Constitution. Congress has 
suggested that such a result in the case of private hospitals may be improper. The Health 
Programs Extension Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(a)(2)(A)(Supp. V 1975), provides that 
the receipt of Hill-Burton funds does not authorize a court to order a private hospital to 
perform an abortion "if the performance of such a procedure or abortion in such facilities is 
prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions." Id. The Court 
in Charleston Area Medical Center, however, found this provision inapplicable. 529 F.2d at 
624 n.7. See generally Abortion Issue Portends New Attacks On Hospitals, ACTION KIT FOR 
HOSPITAL LAW, September 1972. 
The fiduciary duty approach, discussed in Part II, infra, achieves judicial review of staff 
privilege denials without the greater imposition of requiring private hospitals to perform 
abortions against hospital policy. Compare Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 130 N.J. Super. 
416, 327 A.2d 448 (1974) (no fiduciary duty respecting patient abortions) with Greisman v. 
Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963) (fiduciary duty respecting staff 
privileges). 
63 O'Neil v. Grayson County War Memorial Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140, 1143 (6th Cir. 1973); 
Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429, 430 (6th Cir. 1971); Meredith v. Allen 
County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n,,397 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1968). . 
64 Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied; 416 
U.S. 1000 (1974). 
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hospital's board members by a public body, when combined with state 
regulation and funding, is sufficient to satisfy the public function test. In 
Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hospital Commission, 65 th.e 
entire commission operating the private, non-profit hospital was ap-
pointed by the governing body of the county. In addition, the hospital was 
the only one in the area and it had been financed in part with public funds. 
The court held that "[a]n institution such as this, serving an important 
public function and financed in part by public funds, is sufficiently linked 
with the state for its acts to be subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. " 66 
The Sixth Circuit broadened its approach in Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer 
Hospital, Inc., 67 where only five of the nine hospital board members were 
responsible to the public. Under the private hospital's charter, four mem-
bers were appointed by the County Commissioner and a fifth was the 
Judge of the Common Pleas Court. 68 In view of this, the Sixth Circuit in a 
per curiam opinion reversed the district court's ruling that the hospital 
was not a "public agency." Although the hospital had received public 
funding, the court expressly disclaimed reliance on that factor in holding 
that the hospital was a public agency. 69 The court then ruled that, as a 
public agency, the hospital was subject to the plaintiff physician's claim 
that the failure to renew his privileges was arbitrary and discriminatory in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 70 
Public appointment of hospital board members is only one of several 
additional factors that may sustain a finding of state action in a private, 
non-profit hospital under this test. In O'Neil v. Grayson County War 
Memorial Hospital, 71 the court found state action although none of the 
hospital board members were publicly appointed. The court observed that 
the hospital was the only one in the county and was financed in part by 
Hill-Burton funds. 72 The Hospital Foundation also leased premises from 
the County Fiscal Court on a long term basis in exchange for nominal 
consideration and the Foundation's agreement to fulfill all duties incident 
to maintenance and operation of the hospital. 73 The lease further provided 
the Fiscal Court with a reversionary interest in all donations received by 
the hospital and required that the hospital's board contain at least one 
member from each of the county's districts. The court held that all these 
facts were elements of "the public functipn served by the Hospital," 74 
and concluded, "the Hospital is not a purely private institution, immune 
from the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment. " 75 
61; 397 F .2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968). 
66 Id. at 35. 
67 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971). 
68 Id. at 430. 
69 Id. at 430 n. I and accompanying text. 
10 Id. at 430. 
11 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973). 
72 Id. at 1142. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1143. 
15 /d. 
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The public function rationale also appears to have been the basis for a 
finding of state action in a private, non-profit hospital by the District 
Court of Connecticut. In Schlein v. Milford Hospital, 76 the court found 
that because the state licensed physicians and because state licensing of 
hospitals had created a geographic monopoly, the hospital played "a 
pivotal role in the implementation of the state's regulatory authority. " 77 
Therefore, the hospital was required to comply with the due process 
limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The public function test for state action in the hospital setting is com-
mendable because it reflects the increasing tendency of people to view the 
hospital as fulfilling a public function. 78 Some writers have taken the 
position that hospitals have essentially become "public utilities. " 79 Even 
if hospitals are public utilities, however, it does not necessarily follow 
that state action is present. Supreme Court decisions dealing with the 
public function doctrine do not require such a result80 because those 
decisions involved private entities carrying on traditional governmental 
functions, while hospitals have traditionally been non-governmental. 81 In 
addition, the doctrine was originally developed with respect to First 
Amendment issues, not due process and equal protection claims. 82 
Even if decisions applying the public function test to the hospital setting 
have formulated a permissible interpretation of the Supreme Court rul-
ings, the test is nevertheless overly vague.83 Hospitals subject to this test 
cannot adequately determine which factors the court will apply or what 
weight the court will accord particular factors. In addition, the test fails to 
result in findings of state action at many private hospitals. 84 Finally, as 
with the other tests, findings of state action concomitantly subject the 
76 383 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Conn. 1974). 
77 Id. at 1265. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 19-33 (West 1969) (transferred to§ 19-577 in 1976) 
requires a license for anyone wishing to "establish, conduct, operate or maintain" a 
hospital. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 19-36 (West 1969) (transferred to§ 19-580 in 1976) requires 
that in issuing a license, consideration be given to the "demonstrable need for such 
institutions." It is worth noting that a similar North Carolina statute has been held uncon-
stitutional. In re Certificate of Need For Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 
729 ( 1973). 
78 Southwick, Hospital Medical Staff Privileges, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 655, 657 (1969); 
Silver v. _Castle Memorial Hospital, 53 Hawaii 475, 487-90, 497 P.2d 564, 572-74 (1972) (Abe, 
J., concurring), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972). 
79 M. ROEMER & J. FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 20. 
80 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co .. 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974). See notes 41-43 and 
accompanying text supra. See discussion in Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 799 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), afj'd, 506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974); Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540 P.2d 345, 
347-48 (Colo. App. 1975); Moles v. White, 336 So. 2d 427, 429-30 (Fla. App. 1976). 
81 Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D.N .Y. 1974). The principle Supreme 
Court decision is Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), where the Court held that a 
"company town" was subject to constitutional restrictions regarding freedom of press and 
religion. Subsequent Supreme Court opinions may have effectively limited the public func-
tion doctrine to the facts of Marsh. Note, Judicial Re1·iew of Private Hospitals, 75 MICH. 
L.REV. 445, 456-57 n.70 (1976). 
82 See note 81 supra. 
83 The Sixth Circuit recognizes that its approach is vague. O'Neil v. Grayson County 
Memorial Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140, 1143 (6th Cir. 1973). 
84 See Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 
U.S. 1000 (1974). 
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hospital to a range of claims unrelated to the unique issue of staff privilege 
denials. 85 
II. AVAILABILITY OF COMMON LAW PROTECTION: 
THE FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Where the denial of staff privileges comprises a common law tort such 
as defamation86 or in.terference with trade or business,87 the physician 
may bring an appropriate action against the hospital board and members 
of the medical staff. 88 However, where the hospital has held a "quasi-
judicial" hearing concerning the physician's qualifications, statements 
made in connection with the hearing are privileged even though they are 
false and result in an unreasonable denial of staff privileges. 89 In addition, 
85 See note 62 and accompanying text supra. 
86 Goodley v. Sullivant, 32 Cal. App. 3d 619, 108 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1973); Ascherman v. 
Natanson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 861, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1972); DiMiceli v. Klieger, 58 Wis. 2d 
359, 206 N.W.2d 184 (1973). Cf. Raymond v. Cregar, 38 N.J. 472, 185 A.2d 856 (1962) 
(intentionally defamatory remarks tied to malicious interference with staff appointment). 
87 Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 
640 (1962); Burkhart v. Community Medical Center, 432 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. App. 1968); 
Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965); Nashville Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Brinkley, 
534 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1976). But see Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 
F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958). Letsch v. Northern San Diego 
County Hosp. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 673, 55 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1966); Blank v. Palo Alto-
Stanford Hosp. Center, 234 Cal. App. 2d 377, 44 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1965). But cf. Rush v. City 
of St. Petersburg, 205 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1967) (closed radiology department did not constitute 
an illegal corporate practice of medicine). 
88 Although this tort liability may discourage ungrounded privilege denials, it may also go 
too far and result in a grant of staff privileges to an unqualified physician. Those charged 
with evaluating staff often fear that true vigilance on their part will expose them to personal 
liability. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS (JCAH), GUIDELINES FOR THE 
FORMULATION OF MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS 1971, at 49-50 
( 1971). The problem of unqualified physicians obtaining staff privileges is important from the 
hospital's viewpoint because hospitals have been held liable for the negligence of its staff, on 
theories of either vicarious or direct corporate responsibility. Darling v. Charleston Com-
munity Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 
(1966); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975). See 
generally Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change 
Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 429, 440-53 (1973). This 
development has led to the suggestion that hospitals should have greater discretion in 
denying staff privileges, and correspondingly be subject to less judicial review. Huffaker v. 
Bailey, 273 Ore. 273, 282, 540 P.2d 1398, 1402 (1975). However, .it does not follow that 
judicial review to ensure that privileges are not unreasonably denied to a qualified physician 
will in any way affect the hospital's right to deny privileges to an unqualified applicant. 
Indeed, requiring hospitals to adopt sound procedures and criteria should help to ensure that 
only qualified physicians are granted staff privileges. See generally Jo1NT CoMM'N ON 
ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, supra at 10-14, 21-29. 
89 Cf. Ascherman v. Natanson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 861, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1972). The 
primary factors determining the nature of a quasi-judicial hearing applied by the court in 
Ascherman were "(I) whetherthe administrative body is vested with discretion based upon 
investigation and consideration of evidentiary facts, (2) whether it is entitled to hold hearings 
and decide the issue by the application of rules of law to the ascertained facts and, more 
importantly (3) whether its power affects the personal or property rights of private persons 
.... " Id. at 866, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 659. A private hospital's hearing was held "quasi-
judicial" in Goodley v. Sullivant, 32 Cal. App. 3d 619, 108 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1973). But see 
DiMiceli v. Klieger, 58 Wis. 2d 359, 206 N.W.2d 184 (1972). 
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it should be noted that any protection concerning staff privileges provided 
in a hospital's bylaws is judicially enforceable under common law princi-
ples. 90 
A growing minority of courts, when confronted with a private hospital's 
unreasonable denial of staff privileges, have imposed a common law 
fiduciary duty upon the hospital. 91 Under this duty, the hospital must 
ensure that privileges are not denied unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capri-
ciously. 92 As stated by the California courts, the hospital's action must be 
"substantively rational and procedurally fair. " 93 
The crucial issue, with respect to this duty, is determining the cir-
cumstances under which it will be imposed. In the leading case, Greis man 
v. Newcomb Hospital, 94 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
defendant private, non-profit hospital had a fiduciary duty to evaluate the 
plaintiff physician's application for staff privileges on its merits, rather 
than arbitrarily excluding all osteopathic doctors under a provision of the 
hospital's bylaws. In finding a fiduciary duty, the court relied upon its 
determination that the hospital was not strictly private because it had 
received substantial funds from public sources and through public solic-
itations; had received tax benefit~, possessed a virtual monopoly on area 
health care facilities, and was a non-profit organization dedicated by 
virtue of its certificate of incorporation to serving the sick and injured. 
The court further noted that enterprises even more private in nature than 
90 Note, Denial of Hospital Staff Privileges: Hearing and Judicial Review, 56 IOWA L. 
REV. 1351, 1356-57 (1971). 
91 Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., Inc., 114 Ariz. 66, 559 P.2d 186 (Ariz. App. 1976); 
Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 212, 127 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1976); 
Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540 P.2d 345 (Colo. App. 1975); Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 
Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972); Bricker v. Sceva Speare 
Memorial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Davis 
v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 106 N.J. Super. 33, 254 A.2d 125 (1969); Davidson v. 
Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 190hio App. 2d 246, 250 N.E.2d 892 (1969); Woodward v. Porter 
Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966); Rao v. Auburn Gen. Hosp., 10 Wash. App. 
361, 517 P.2d 240 (1973). 
For dicta expressing approval of the fiduciary duty approach, see Fahey v. Holy Family 
Hosp., 32 Ill. App. 3d 537, 336 N.E.2d 309 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); 
Burkhart v. Community Medical Center, 432 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1968); Dillard v. Rowland, 
520 S.W.2d 81, 91 (Mo. App. 1974); Alderv. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 453 Pa. 60, 311 A.2d 
634 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974). But see Moles v. White, 336 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 
App. 1976); Gotsis v. Lorain Community Hosp., 46 Ohio App. 2d 8, 345 N.E.2d 641 (1975); 
Ponca City Hosp., Inc. v. Murphree, 545 P.2d 738 (Okla. 1976). 
92 Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540 P.2d 345, 348 (Colo. App. 1975). 
93 Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 511-12, 119 Cal. 
Rptr. ~07, 509 (1975), quoting Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 
541, 550, 526 P.2d 253, 260, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 260 (1974). The California courts have also 
incorporated principles of administrative law, such as the "substantial basis test" and the 
"exhaustion of administrative remedies" doctrines, into their analysis. Anton v. San An-
tonio Community Hosp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 212, 127 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398, 400 (1976). The 
substantial basis test limits the scope of review by the court by requiring that the hospital's 
action be sustained if there is a substantial basis for the decision in the evidence considered 
as a whole. The exhaustion doctrine provides that an appeal to the court is not available until 
the physician has exhausted all remedies within the hospital. See generally K. DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 20.01-20.10, and §§ 29.0i-29.11 (1958). 
94 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963). 
FALL 1977] Hospital Medical Staff 107 
hospitals had been subjected to state regulation.95 The court also ob-
served that courts had imposed a common law duty on innkeepers, 
carriers, and farriers to serve all "comers." Finally, the court noted that 
it had the power to expand the common law to serve current public needs 
and cited its own recent decision96 vesting a local medical society with a 
fiduciary duty respecting membership applications. Therefore, the court 
concluded that it was justified in imposing a similar duty on the defendant 
hospital. 
Some courts continue to require either substantial funding or a virtual 
monopoly before they will review a hospital's denial of staff privileges 
under the fiduciary duty approach. In Peterson v. Tucson General Hos pi-
. tal, Inc., 97 for example, the Arizona Appellate Court surveyed the vari-
ous doctrines for judicial review of private hospitals, and concluded that 
review in the present case was proper because the defendant, -a private, 
non-profit hospital, constituted a virtual monopoly. In Silver v. Castle 
Memorial Hospital, 98 the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that a private 
hospital was subject to judicial review where it received "more than 
nominal governmental involvement in the form of funding. " 99 The court 
viewed such a hospital as a "quasi-public" institution. 100 
In New Jersey cases decided since Greisman v. New.comb Hospital, 
the factors of substantial funding and geographic monopoly have not been 
emphasized. 101 Recent cases in California and Colorado have gone 
further and have imposed the fiduciary duty on virtually all non-profit 
hospitals. In Hawkins v. Kif!sie, 102 the Colorado Appellate Court held 
that judicial review of the hospital's failure to renew the plaintiff's staff 
privileges was available because the hospital, although private, was a 
non-profit corporation conducted for the benefit of the general public, and 
because physicians and patients generally would be penalized if no re-
medy were available. In Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial Hospi-
ta[, 103 the plaintiff physician already had privileges at other hospitals and 
earned a gross annual income in excess of $80,000. Nevertheless, the 
California Appellate Court held that he was entitled to a fair evaluation of 
his application because staff privileges at the defendant, non-profit hospi-
tal would greatly enhance the plaintiff's convenience in practicing his 
profession. 
In a subsequent decision, Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospi-
95 The regulated activities included charges for the storage of grain, fire insurance rates, 
and the milk industry. Id. at 396, 192 A.2d at 821. 
96 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961). Accord, 
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 
245 (1974). 
97 114 Ariz. 66, 559 P.2d 186 (Ariz. App. 1976). 
98 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert. denied, 40') U.S. 1048 (1972). 
99 Id. at 483, 497 P.2d at 570. 
100 Id. at 481, 497 P.2d at 569. Cf. Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N .J. Super. 418, 
231 A.2d 389 (1967). 
101 Davis v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 106 N.J. Super. 33, 254 A.2d 125 (1969); 
Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (1967). 
102 540 P.2d 345, 348-49 (Colo. App. 1975). . 
103 45 Cal. App. 3d 500, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507, 508 (1975). 
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ta/, 104 the California Appellate Court held that all non-profit hospitals 
have a fiduciary duty respecting the denial of staff privileges. The court 
stated: 
An entity operating a private, non-profit hospital assumes a public 
trust which carries with it an obligation to deal fairly with the public it 
serves and with the doctors to whom it accords hospital 
privileges .... The fiduciary obligation to the doctors requires obser-
vance of 'fair procedure' in making decisions pertaining to medical 
staff membership. 105 
The fiduciary duty approach achieves essentially the same safeguards 
for the physician as those provided by the Constitution;106 therefore, the 
same burden is imposed on the hospital under either approach. Ordinary 
costs associated with the hearing procedure should be incorporated into 
the hospital's non-profit operating budget. 107 On the other hand, it may be 
appropriate for the physician to pay for the cost of inspecting or copying 
documents in the hospital's possession bearing on charges against the 
physician. 108 Eventually, many hospitals may even benefit financially 
from the hearing procedures. Improved selection procedures may reduce 
the hospital's insurance payments, 109 and may reduce the number of 
cases in which the hospital is found vicariously or corporately liable for 
physician negligence. 11° For some hospitals, an increase in the number of 
physicians who are granted staff privileges may produce an increase in the 
number of patients and, consequently, an increase in net revenue.11 1 
The fiduciary approach, however, differs from the constitutional ap-
proach in several important ways. First, the fiduciary duty approach 
encompasses a greater number of hospitals. 112 Furthermore, by clearly 
extending the duty to all non-profit hospitals, the fiduciary duty approach 
permits hospital administrators to plan accordingly in formulating proce-
dures for evaluating applicants. In contrast, the constitutional approach 
based on state action is uncertain in scope, and is subject to superceding 
decisions of the Supreme Court. 113 Also, the fiduciary duty can be limited 
to the issue of staff privileges, thus avoiding inappropriate constitutional 
claims by patients. 114 
104 55 Cal. App. 3d 212, 127 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1976). 
105 Id. at 398. 
106 Se._e note 24 and accompanying text supra. 
107 Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56, 64 (8th Cir. 1975). 
• 0 • Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974). 
109 Note, supra note 90, at 1351. 
110 See note 88 supra. 
111 See note 5 supra. 
112 Compare Barrett v. United Hospital, 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 506 
F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974) with Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 212, 
127 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1976). 
113 See note 60 and accompanying text supra. 
114 See note 62 and accompanying text supra. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The modern physician needs staff privileges at a conveniently located 
hospital. The public needs more physicians with easy access to hospitals. 
The hospital needs a large enough medical staff to ensure maximum use of 
its health care facilities. Nevertheless, staff privileges continue to be 
denied unreasonably. Judicial review is necessary to curtail inadequate or 
secretive procedures and to discourage arbitrary, discriminatory, or self-
serving recommendations by the hospital's current medical staff. 
The imposition of a common law fiduciary duty avoids subjecting 
private hospitals to constitutional claims unrelated to the unique staff 
privilege issue, and also avoids strained interpretations ofrecent Supreme 
Court rulings on state action. Furthermore, imposing the duty on all 
private, non-profit hospitals provides an easily applied test. Finally, and 
most importantly, because all non-profit hospitals are subject to the 
fiduciary duty, this approach achieves optimal protection for physicians, 
hospitals, and the public. 
-David Hejna 
